Can Europe Defend Ukraine (And Itself)?
Early thoughts on a post-American NATO
Can Europe defend Ukraine without American military aid? And can it defend itself without America’s backing? These once unthinkable questions are now very much on point — with European and Ukrainian leaders having to contemplate how they will cope without the United States.
Earlier this week, I joined a discussion on Politico’s EU Confidential podcast to talk about just these questions. You can listen to the entire episode, which was hosted by Sarah Wheaton and where I was joined by Florence Gaub of the NATO Defense College. Below is a (slightly) edited transcription of some of my key points.
On whether Congress will pass the Senate deal tying aid for Ukraine (and Israel, Gaza, and Taiwan) to border security measures.
It doesn't look like it's going to pass Congress. We are in a really strange world here in which it was the Republicans in the House and the Senate who insisted that any big supplemental funding for Ukraine and then later Israel needed to be accompanied not only by funding for, but changes in policy towards, the border to have more control over those who are crossing into the United States and asking for asylum. And the reality is that we now are in campaign season. And whatever the likely nominee of the Republican Party says is what happens on Capitol Hill. And Donald Trump said no to the deal because he wants the “chaos at the border,” as he calls it, to be a political issue until the November elections. And as long as that's the case, this bill is not going to go anywhere. Now whether another bill with Ukraine and Israel aid might get through is TBD, but I think we shouldn't count on.
On the practical consequences for Ukraine and for Europe of no US aid.
The practical consequence of Ukraine are real because there is only one place in the world that has the military capacity necessary for Ukraine to both defend itself at the front with more artillery shells and other munitions and to defend the cities against air attack. And that is the US military. It's materiel that is sitting in the US military stockpiles that can only be transferred after congressional authorization. So it requires a vote by Congress. It can’t be produced in short order. At some point it can be produced. At some point, both in Europe and in the United States production lines will be able to spit out new 155 millimeter artillery shells and the kind of air defense missiles that are necessary. But that's not going to happen this year. So the problem isn't even that the Europeans will have to pick up the slack because they don't have the capacity to pick it up.
If you look at the response to Ukraine and the commitment Europe continues to make to Ukraine, they're not the weak poll in the tent. Turns out it's on our side of the Atlantic. And all because we have a Congress, and a political system, where a minority can undermine the strategic potential of a country.
You really are stuck in 2024 with the reality that the Ukrainians are not going to have the military capabilities necessary to hold the line. Now they may still be able to hold the line in all kinds of other ways—and Russian stupidity and tactical incompetence should never be underestimated as we've seen in the last two years. But that's a faint hope to hang the future on. It does mean that Europe needs to get very serious about production and capabilities and what it needs to do because this sends a signal that the United States cannot be trusted. It cannot be relied upon. And that is a signal that is not only tied to this particular event. It's tied to our elections and the reality that if Donald Trump is president, this may become the norm rather than the exception.
On the consequences of Trump being elected.
Trump actually does not see any value in alliances. He doesn't understand the concept of working together with other countries to maximize the capacity to compete or get things done. He is always focused on winning, not leading. And winning you do by beating the other side. And he has a tendency to look at the other side as being allies, who are the ones who trade the most with the United States, with whom we rely on more than anyone else. And he doesn't see the value, he doesn't see win-win propositions in the way that alliances are built. He is deeply hostile to NATO. He is deeply hostile to bilateral alliances that we have in Asia. He withdrew troops from Germany. And all of this is on the table, including the possible withdrawal from NATO itself, although whether he does or not actually is less important than the reality that no one will be able to rely on the United States if he is president. If that's not an incentive for Europeans to start to invest in their own capabilities and their own defense structures, then I don't know what it is because obviously without the United States and without European cooperation, you're relying on national capabilities those are just insufficient to deal with the threats that Europe faces.
On what Europe needs to do.
The big question is: how do you bring strategic coherence at the European level? It probably makes sense to do that within an EU-like structure, if not in the EU itself, and develop a strategic outlook that no longer relies on the United States but takes European interests as the guide for how to to engage the world as it is, rather than as we would like it to be.
But when it comes to defense we need to start thinking beyond the EU. Specifically, what does NATO look like without American leadership or indeed without its presence? If, in the worst case, the United States were to decide under Article 13 to withdraw from the treaty, what does NATO offer Europe in terms of defense? Well, one thing it offers over the EU is an existing structure, processes, procedures, and programs that already work. The other thing that it offers is membership of countries that are pretty darn critical, who are not members of the EU, starting with the UK, but including Norway, a very important country for the defense of Europe, and Canada, a transatlantic ally, with real interests in the Arctic. They are all important members.
The question isn't how does the EU do this? No, the question becomes, how can you have a post-American, or post-American led NATO that is effective in helping Europe to ensure its security? And that includes dealing with Ukraine, not only what's happening on the ground now, but its membership in NATO in the future. And that's a different debate than I think we've had for a very long time. The EU versus NATO debates is old and stale. But the Europeanization of NATO is something new and a debate that we need to have.
On European strategic culture and leadership.
There are, of course, leaders in Europe who have the capacity to think strategically and may well do so when forced to think about it. And you might not see that right now, but they may surprise us in the future. I mean, you do have people like Donald Tusk. You do have, I don't know, who's going to be president in Finland, but whoever one of the two candidates are both highly capable, strategic thinkers. You do have Macron and a French culture that is more strategic. In some ways, Georgia Meloni has surprised all of us with being more strategic and more collaborative than people were expecting. And, as they say, the mother of necessity will be to become strategic because there is no alternative.
So there's no reason to think that Europe can't do it. It's just not going to happen until it happens because it’s necessary. Olaf Scholz would never have been able to give the speech he did on February 26, 2022, announcing Germany’s Zeitenwende, but for the fact that Putin invaded Ukraine. So it was the shock of something that he was told was going to happen over and over again, didn't believe would happen, and then did happen that led to a strategic transformation.
The shock of Donald Trump being elected should bring forth the kind of leadership that Europe needs. And it would be a strategic culture that, yes, is a peace culture, but it is a culture that recognizes that the need to avoid war, which is where the peace culture comes from, is paramount. And the way we avoid wars is through collaboration. And so I'm an optimist when it comes to European collaboration on these issues. And I think we should have pushed it a long time ago. I think it would have been in America's interest to have strong European defense industries, a strong European strategic culture. A stronger Europe is what we want. Our problem is a weak Europe, not a strong Europe. And we've misplayed it for a long time. I would go further. If you look at the response to Ukraine and the commitment that Europe continues to make to Ukraine, they're not the weak poll in the tent. Turns out it's on our side of the Atlantic. And all because we have a Congress, and a political system, where a minority can undermine the strategic potential of a country.