Israel’s Strike Shows US Weakness
Trump was trying to close in on a nuclear deal with Iran, but Netanyahu would have none of it. His decision to attack its nuclear facilities shows how much US influence has weakened.
In the days since Israel launched its war against Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities, one question above all has dominated discussions: What did President Trump tell Prime Minister Netanyahu before Israel struck? To many, it is inconceivable that Netanyahu would have launched the major attacks without at least US acquiescence.
“No Israeli prime minister would have dared to have done this had he got a resounding ‘no’ from Trump,” Aaron David Miller, who worked for six US Presidents, told the Financial Times. According to Miller and many others, it was all part of an elaborate ruse, in which Trump pretended he wanted a diplomatic solution to give Israel the space to launch a surprise preventive war against Iran.
Trump Wants Diplomacy, Not War
History might prove this thinking correct. But I don’t buy it. Trump is animated by two core convictions—that he has the strength to avoid wars and conflict and a unique ability to strike deals. Forty years ago he suggested that he was the best person to negotiate an arms control deal with Russia. Ten years ago he ran for president in opposition to endless wars that only he could end. And this year, in his inaugural address, he promised that his “proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier.”
When it comes to Iran, every indication suggests that Trump was serious about wanting a deal with Tehran. Yes, he threatened Iran with widespread destruction if a deal wasn’t reached. But that is part of his negotiating strategy. Remember “fire and fury,” his threat against North Korea during his first term? Months later he became the first American president ever to meet with a North Korean leader. (When no deal was reached, there was neither fire nor fury. Trump just walked away.)
A sixth round of talks between Iran and the United States was scheduled to take place in Oman this Sunday. There clearly were differences, notably about Iran’s insistence that it had a right to enrich uranium on its own soil. Steve Witkoff, Trump’s peace envoy, was trying to bridge the gap, including by offering Iran limited enrichment on its territory until a regional enrichment facility could be built—something that would take years, if not decades. Trump repeatedly asserted that a deal was close.
Aside from much preferring a diplomatic outcome, Trump had also made repeatedly clear that he did not favor a military attack. He fired Mike Waltz, his first national security adviser, in part because Waltz had connived with Jerusalem to push for Trump’s agreement to an Israeli strike—plans for which had been in the making for years. And just hours before Israeli planes took off for Iran, Trump said “I don’t want them to go in.” Adding, “I think it would blow” the negotiations. Even after the strikes, Trump maintained on Friday morning that a deal was still possible.
Why Strike Now
Netanyahu clearly understood Trump’s view on the matter. And, yet, he ignored the US president’s pleas and decided to launch a preventive war in any case. On the one hand, this is not surprising. For 20 years, Netanyahu has seen Iran and its nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel and believed that only a military strike could take it out. He had actively campaigned for military action during the Obama administration and openly campaigned against the Iran nuclear deal struck in 2025 (including in an address to Congress). He had cheered Trump when, in 2018, the US withdrew from that agreement, hoping that Washington would now agree to destroy Iran’s nuclear program through military action.
Even so, until Friday morning, Netanyahu had been dissuaded from striking Iran’s nuclear facilities. Despite his opposition to President Obama’s nuclear deal, he agreed not to launch an attack. And while Israel launched the first ever strikes against Iran in April and October last year, Netanyahu acceded to President Biden’s plea not to hit its nuclear facilities.
Part of the reason for his deference is the reality that Israel does not have the conventional military ability to destroy Iran’s nuclear program from the air. Part of Iran’s nuclear program is buried deep underground, notably the Fordow advanced enrichment site that was to be shuttered under the 2015 nuclear deal but has since been expanded. The site is half a mile inside a mountain, and only the use of the 30,000 ton “mother of all bombs” can penetrate that deep. The US hasn’t provided Israel with this ordinance, nor does Israel have the bomber force that would be needed to deliver it. Short of using a nuclear weapon (an option that doesn’t seem to be in the cards, at least not now) the only way to destroy Fordow is by using ground forces (a very risky proposition) or convincing the US to finish the job.
This military reality was one major reason Netanyahu deferred to US pleas not to strike before. But while the military reality hasn’t changed, his calculation apparently has. Why? In part because the strategic circumstances have changed. Israel is stronger and Iran weaker than it has been in many years—not least because of Israel’s successful destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah, proxy forces that Iran built as a deterrent to Israeli attack. Iran’s military has also suffered greatly from last year’s Israeli strikes, especially those in October that took out critical air defense capabilities.
That said, the fundamental reality remains that Israel lacks an air and missile capability to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. Not only does Fordow remain impervious to attack from the air, but the large quantities of enriched uranium Iran has produced since Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018 can be widely dispersed and provide Iran with a future stock of materials to build a bomb.
US Weakness as a Green Light
Which leaves open the question: Why now? Why launch a military attack now and not earlier? Obama and Biden both objected to an Israeli strike, and Netanyahu deferred to them. Trump also objected, but Netanyahu went ahead, nevertheless. Maybe, as some argue, Trump winked, said no publicly and yes privately, blinked a yellow light but not a red light. Maybe.
But it is also possible—I think even likely—that Netanyahu ignored Trump’s pleas. Since returning to the White House, Trump has pulled America back from the world. He’s told other countries to take care of themselves — to put themselves first just as he was putting America first. Trump had repeatedly ignored Israeli interests over the past four months. He negotiated a deal with the Houthis that ended its targeting of US ships, but did not address Houthi targeting of Israel. He negotiated directly with Hamas to get the last US citizen held hostage released but ignored the Israeli hostages that remain. He traveled to the Persian Gulf and struck deals with the Saudis, Emirates, and Qataris and didn’t even stop in Israel on the way.
Trump’s eagerness for a deal with Iran confronted Netanyahu once again with a choice he didn’t Iike. Either accept a fait accompli of a bad deal, as happened in 2015. Or forestall a bad deal by launching a major attack on Iran that would end any negotiations. And while Netanyahu had deferred to Obama and Biden, Trump wasn’t able to force Netanyahu to defer to him.
And so Netanyahu decided to go to war.
How Will This End?
The war is still in its very early stages—just 48 hours old. Israel has decapitated Iran’s military leadership, killed key nuclear scientists, and damaged Iran’s enrichment site in Natanz and fuel fabrication site in Isfahan. Fordow remains unscathed, as is Iran’s large stock of enriched uranium, which Tehran will by now have dispersed from the storage site international inspectors visited just a few weeks ago.
Iran’s response—hundreds of missiles targeted at Israeli cities that have already led to casualties—underscores that the war is likely to escalate. Netanyahu is even hinting at regime change as his ultimate goal. The conflict is likely to continue for days, perhaps weeks, if not longer.
That said, it is not too early to take stock. Unless Netanyahu can convince Trump to bomb Fordow and thus pull the United States into the war with Iran, Fordow is likely to stand whenever this war ends. (If Israel decides to send in ground forces or, worse, use a nuclear weapon, then all bets are off.) Iran is also likely to retain a significant amount of enriched uranium. In other words, Netanyahu’s central goal of eliminating Iran’s nuclear capability is unlikely to be achieved by his use of force.
Perhaps the people rise up against the theocratic regime, as Netanyahu has called on them to do. Or perhaps the Ayatollah is toppled by hard liners who blame him for not building a bomb sooner. But whomever emerges in power after the war will understand that diplomacy doesn’t work. Only hard power — nuclear power — does. And whether it takes one year, two years, or more, any regime that rules Iran will want the security that only a nuclear bomb can provide it.
That reality has always been at the core of the Iranian nuclear dilemma. Netanyahu has wanted to erase that reality for 20 years. But he can’t. And that is the true tragedy of the situation the region and the world now face.