The War in Gaza After 100 Days
Israel Can Succeed Only By Shifting Course
100 days ago, thousands of Hamas fighters ran, drove, and flew across the Gaza border into Israel to unleash the worst slaughter of Jews since the Holocaust. In a well-coordinated and long-planned attack, Hamas fighters sowed terror in Kibbutzim, military barracks, roadways, farm fields, and a music festival—killing, raping, and pillaging all who stood in their way. By the end of the day, more than 1,200 people had been killed and over 3,000 more wounded. Close to 250 people, including toddlers and elderly, had been kidnapped and taken to Gaza.
This is how the Gaza War started—not by Israeli airstrikes or a ground invasion that has been the focus of so much commentary, analysis, and argument ever since. But for Hamas’s brutality, there would not have been a Gaza War. No one would have died, been taken hostage, been displaced, or suffered in any way. But for Hamas’s terror.
The Right to Self-Defense
Israel had every right to defend itself. Indeed, it had a solemn duty to do so—both as an independent nation whose first responsibility is to protect its citizens and as a state that was born out of the promise that Jews would never again have to fear for their lives just because they were Jews.
The question, 100 days into this war, is not whether Israel was right to go to war against Hamas. Of that there can be no doubt. The question rather is whether the way it went to war was the right way—both in terms of exacting a cost on Hamas and of ensuring Israel’s long-term security. And of that, there has been doubt from the start. The time has come for Israel to shift course—and for the United States, Israel’s largest and most important ally, to tell Israel plainly that it needs to do so.
“We Are At War”
When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared on October 7, even before the full scale of Hamas’s terror had become apparent, that “we are at war” Israel settled on a singular goal for its military strategy: the complete destruction of Hamas to ensure that what happened on October 7 could never happen again. (Later, the Israeli government added the return of all hostages as an objective of the war; but that goal has always been subordinate to the destruction of Hamas.)
The time has come for Israel to shift course—and for the United States, Israel’s largest and most important backer, to tell Israel plainly that it needs to do so.
To that end, Israel mobilized 360,000 reservists and launched massive airstrikes against Gaza, a densely populated strip along the Mediterranean that is home to 2.3 million Palestinians who have been effectively cut off from the rest of the world as a result of blockade imposed by Israel and Egypt since Hamas gained power in Gaza in 2007. At the start of the Gaza War, Israel also imposed “a complete siege” on Gaza. “There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed,” Defense Minister Yoav Gallant declared on October 9. “We are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly.”
The Cost of War
Those two measures—unrelenting military strikes from air, land, and sea, and an effective siege of Gaza—have essentially defined Israel’s strategy for the past 100 days. The government at times has relented to outside pressure, letting some humanitarian aid in and adjusting the pace of military operations to allow people to move to parts of Gaza that were not being bombed at that time. It has also agreed to temporary pauses in exchange for the release of some hostages. But the overall effort has been singularly focused on trying to destroy Hamas.
That effort has come at a truly staggering cost for the people of Gaza. More than 23,000 people killed—1 percent of the pre-war population—the majority civilians, many women and children. Eighty-five percent, 1.9 million people, have been displaced from their homes. Sixty percent of housing stock is uninhabitable. And food shortages are reaching starvation levels for large numbers of people. As the New York Times, reported on January 11:
The number of people facing possible starvation in the Gaza Strip in the coming weeks is the largest share of a population at risk of famine identified anywhere since a United Nations-affiliated panel created the current global food-insecurity assessment 20 years ago.
And, yet, there is no end in sight for this war—or for the resulting suffering of the people of Gaza. Israel insists this will be a long war, because its goals have not yet been achieved. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) now estimate that some 9,000 Hamas fighters had been killed. That’s only about one-third of those it estimated to have been in Gaza at the outset. It has yet to locate, let alone eliminate, the top Hamas leadership in Gaza. Much of Hamas’s extensive tunnel network remains in place, including underground crossings from Egypt into Southern Gaza. Hamas has continued to. launch rockets against Israel—totaling some 9,000 since the war started. If the goal is to destroy Hamas in Gaza, Israel still has a very long way to go.
Can Israel Succeed?
Which raises a fundamental question: Can Israel achieve the goal it has set for itself? Or, at least, can it succeed at an acceptable cost—even for Israel? As a movement with a presence not only in Gaza but in the West Bank and in neighboring countries, Hamas can never be totally eradicated. Its rule of Gaza can be terminated. The infrastructure that made it possible to launch the October 7 attack can be destroyed. Its leaders can be hunted down and brought to justice. Its capacity to threaten the existence of Israel can be reduced substantially. Gaza can even be flattened and its population expelled. But that wouldn’t destroy Hamas. It would only transform it, produce a new generation of Hamas fighters, and probably make it stronger elsewhere.
The idea that Hamas itself can be destroyed is and always has been a chimera.
None of this is surprising. It’s been clear from the very beginning of this war that Israel’s strategy cannot succeed. Netanyahu talks of “continuing the war until the end — until total victory, until we achieve all of our goals,” which he now defines as “eliminating Hamas, returning all of our hostages and ensuring that Gaza will never again constitute a threat to Israel.” But the first is unachievable, the second is in conflict with the first, and even achieving the third goal would not necessarily enhance Israel’s security—which is what “total victory” is supposed to achieve.
The Israeli government and security forces insist that the only way to get the hostages released is through military pressure on Hamas. But there is no evidence to suggest this is true. To the contrary, the only time large numbers of hostages were released is when all military action was paused. The war itself has in some tragic instances even led to the killing of the very hostages Israel seeks to free. Indeed, it’s clear to a growing number of Israelis that the goal of eliminating Hamas is making it more, not less, difficult to achieve the goal of returning all hostages.
Removing Hamas Isn’t Total Victory
What about the third, more strategic goal of ensuring Gaza will never again constitute a threat to Israel? That might be an achievable goal, but not with the current strategy of unrelenting military strikes and a virtual siege of Gaza. Israel’s security doesn’t just depend on the elimination of Hamas from Gaza. It depends on finding a solution to the overall conflict of which this war is a part. And that requires thinking through what happens to Gaza and the people who live there after the war. It also depends on addressing the larger question of Israel’s relations with the Palestinian people who have been living under occupation since 1967. And it requires that Israel’s current strategy be consistent with that larger political objective.
But that is not the view of the Israeli government. It has refused to engage in serious discussions on what happens in Gaza once Hamas is removed. And it has dismissed any effort to think through “the day after” in Gaza, let alone whether an opportunity exists to pursue peace with its Palestinian and Arab neighbors. Far from it. For Netanyahu, the war makes the need for a settlement less pressing or necessary.
When President Biden visited Israel days after the Hamas attacks he pointedly warned Israel not to repeat the mistakes America had made in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. One of the biggest mistakes America made was to go to war against Afghanistan (and then Iraq) without thinking through who would govern the country after its rulers were removed. Rather than ensuring the answer to that obvious question was part of its strategy, the United States made up the answer on the fly—with disastrous consequences for both countries, as well as for America itself.
Israel cannot afford not to think now about who rules Gaza after Hamas is removed. Yet, that is precisely what the Israeli security establishment has done. Since the outset of the war, it has dismissed the question and ignored those trying to answer it.
And now it is left with no answer. There is no internal capacity within Gaza to govern the strip once the fighting ends. The war has destroyed the very infrastructure of governing. There is no appetite among Arab countries to take any role in governing and rebuilding Gaza given that its destruction was the direct result of Israel’s military action. There is no possibilty that the United Nations or the international community will take on this responsibility—any willingness to do so has vanished in light of the horrendous suffering imposed on the people of Gaza. No US or European leader would accept a role in governing Gaza or even providing security.
There is only Israel itself. And, yet, if there is one thing Israelis agree on it is that Israel should not reoccupy and take responsibility for governing Gaza again. Israel ended its occupation in 2005, and it’s only on the far-right fringes of Israeli society (admittedly including some ministers in the current government) that an Israeli return to Gaza is seen as viable or desirable.
So, the question of who rules Gaza—now a vast wasteland populated by more than 2 million people, surviving without the basics of human life let alone the foundation for a modern society—hangs out there, unanswered. Gaza has become a truly “failed state,” with no order or leadership or even the basic ability to provide for its people. At best, it constitutes a breeding ground for a new generation of terrorists and thus a direct threat to Israel’s security. How does any of that constitute “total victory?”
What Washington Must Do Now
Israel has made the very mistakes that Biden suggested they avoid when he visited ten days after the most tragic day in Israel’s 75 year history. Israel did not listen. And despite dozens of phone calls, frequent cabinet-level visits, and hours of pleading and conversation, in which US officials have urged their counterparts to think again and change course, Israel is still not listening.
The time has come for Biden to make himself heard. The war, as currently conducted by the IDF, needs to end. No more airstrikes with 2,000 pound bombs. No more large-scale ground operations. Instead, the IDF must rely on highly targeted strikes aimed at eliminating Hamas leaders.
The focus needs to shift to governance and security. To rebuilding and reconstruction. The best way to ensure Israeli security is not to vanquish its enemies but to create viable and vibrant societies that have a vested interest in peace.
That now must be the Israeli goal: end the war and begin to build a true peace. Biden needs to tell the Israeli people that Israel will have no better and stronger partner to build a real peace than America. He needs to lay out a clear vision of what such a peace would look like: two states, one Jewish and one Palestinian, living side-by-side, both with security, prosperity, and dignity. And he needs to make clear that it is that achievement that would constitute Israel’s total victory.
Biden also needs to take practical steps to promote his vision. He must tell the Israeli people that Israel needs to end the current phase of the Gaza war, starting with a pause in all military operations in return for the release of hostages. Israel must also allow large amounts of food, water, medical, and other critical aid into every corner of Gaza to meet the most immediate needs of the people of Gaza, while ensuring the aid reaches those most in need and not Hamas fighters.
In the longer term, building a viable and revitalized Palestinian governing entity is critical to success. This needs to be a joint effort, led by the United States, to which Arab countries, European nations, and Israel contribute. Settlement activity in the West Bank must stop. Funds that belong to the Palestinian people held by Israel must be transferred. Palestinian institutions necessary for effective governance—including security and police forces—need to be reformed and strengthened with Western and Arab aid and assistance. To demonstrate its commitment to peace between Israel and the Palestinians, the United States should recognize a Palestinian state, reopen the US consulate in East Jerusalem, and appoint a high-level team, reporting directly to the President, to lead the effort in Washington and the region.
None of this will be easy. But there is no peace, no security, no victory for Israel until and unless the conflict that has threatened it for decades is finally brought to an end. It’s time for Biden to go to Israel and tell its people that hard truth.